The BC went to the side B door, located one floor below street level, and forced the door with the Engine 11 crew on the hoseline. The crew from Engine 24, assigned to back up Engine 26, and a split crew from Rescue 1 tried to make entry through the door in the garage but could not advance due to the heat. Is the fire floor which is below grade from street level. The side C of the fire structure – the balcony A few minutes later the IC again tried to contact Engine 26 via radio with no response. The BC stated they would attack the fire from the side B of the structure and exited the front door. The lieutenant stated to the BC that the fire must be a floor below them. A battalion chief (BC) assigned to “the fire attack group” followed the hoseline through the door and spoke to the victims on the street level floor. Minutes later, the incident commander (IC) tried contacting them over the radio, but received no response.
When Engine 26, staffed with a lieutenant, fire fighter/paramedic (the victims), and driver arrived at approximately 1048 hours, they noticed light smoke showing as they made entry through the front door, side A, street level, of the building. Six companies and three command chiefs were dispatched to a report of an electrical fire at a residential home.
The fire floor was one floor below street level. Note: The residential structure where the fatalities occurred was built on a significantly sloped hillside common throughout the city. On June 02, 2011, a 48 year-old career lieutenant and a 53 year-old fire fighter/paramedic died in a multi-level residential structure fire while searching for the seat of the fire. Death in the Line of Duty…A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation